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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of the role of forensic economics in competition law and 
policy the last four decades has been a major episode in the professionalization of 
economics and its increasing interaction with the legal sphere. Yet, there have only 
been very few studies examining from a sociological perspective the impact of 
forensic economics on the development of the research agenda of industrial 
economics and more generally the production of economic knowledge. The aim of 
this study is to critically examine how the emergence of forensic economics may 
impact on the production and evaluation of economic knowledge. The hypothesis to 
be investigated is that the production of economic knowledge, “in the context of 
application” (that is, “following the codes of practice relevant to a particular 
discipline and problem solving which is organised around a particular application”1) 
across a heterogeneous environment characterized by the presence of multiple 
institutions (e.g. Universities, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
private consultancies) affects the research agenda and the epistemic validity of the 
discipline of economics. The research will focus on an area of economics, with a 
significant “context of application”, the field of applied Industrial Organization (IO) 
or competition economics. It will also concentrate on the analysis of the impact of 
private economic consultancies, as opposed to other institutions. The objective is to 
reflect on the theoretical foundations of a sociological analysis of forensic economics 
and more broadly on the relationship of academic economic “science” and economic 
science produced in the context of application (regulatory science), in this case 
economics applied in the field of competition law and policy. After examining the 
emergence of forensic economics as a separate field (2), we will examine the reality 
of forensic economics from the perspective of various theoretical approaches in 
sociology. 
 
2. The emergence of forensic economics 
 
2.1. Topography: the field of forensic economics 
 
Forensic economics touches upon the relation between economics and the 
legal system. The interaction of the fields of law and economics is an old story
2
. 
                                            
1
 Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwarztman, Peter Scott & 
Martin Trow, The New Production of Knowledge (SAGE Publications, 1994), p. 3. 
2
  See, J. Walter Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1956), at 235-269; D. Hughes Parry, „Economic Theories in English Case Law‟ (1931) 47 LQR 183-
202. 
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However, because of its profound interaction with the legal system and the core of 
economic thought, the field of forensic economics presents new challenges to the 
sociology of knowledge. It is thus important to distinguish forensic economics from 
other approaches that put law and economics in relation to each other.  
One of these is the “law and economics” movement. Explicitly adopting an 
“external approach”, this literature considers whether specific legal interventions are 
acceptable when assessed against an external, to law, criterion of validity. The “law 
and economics” scholarship advanced as a criterion the concept of economic 
efficiency, itself framed according to neoclassical economic theory and the idea of 
equilibrium, thus a principle entirely external and disconnected to the legal system. 
The interplay of law with economics acquired rapidly a normative interest as a 
research question, as economic concepts and methods were directly influential in re-
framing and in enriching legal discourse. Nevertheless, the opposite is not true: legal 
discourse did not influence the evolution of economic discourse. Indeed, the Coase 
theorem led to a certain degree of indifference to legal institutions in economic 
analysis, one of the basic tenets of the theorem suggesting that when transaction costs 
are low efficiency can be achieved through bargaining, without any contribution from 
the legal system
3
, hence, the ignorance by an important segment of the law and 
economics literature of the institutional environment of each jurisdiction. 
The development of the “law and economics” movement as a “recognized 
sub-discipline” and research area in economics was made explicit by the publication 
in 1958 of the “Journal of Law and Economics” and the inclusion of the area of law 
and economics as item K in the “classification system for books” of the Journal of 
Economic Literature”4. With the assistance of external funding, in particular the Ohlin 
Foundation, the “law and economics” movement expanded from North America in the 
1960s to Europe in the 1990s
5
 and involved, for the first time within the same field, 
lawyers and economists, although one could easily remark the relative dominance of 
economists: the number of economists publishing Law and Economics studies is more 
than six times higher than the number of lawyers; in North America it is less than 
three times higher; the rate of participation of economists in law and economic 
journals is relatively similar in Europe, the United States and Canada. Lawyers‟ rates 
of participation differ substantially, ranging from 0.82 in Europe to more than four 
times that number in the United States and about forty times that number in Israel
6
.  
 
Figure 1: Participation in Authorship of Law and Economics Articles 
                                            
3
  R.H. Coase, „The Problem of Social Cost‟ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1–44. 
This was not necessarily what R. Coase himself had in mind, as he had recognized elsewhere the 
importance of institutions in economic theorizing. R. H. Coase, „The Nature of the Firm‟ (1937) 4 
Economica 386–405. One should wait the new institutional school of economics for institutions to be 
again the subject of mainstream economic theory: 
4
  T. R. Ireland, „The Interface between Law and Economics and Forensic Economics‟, (1997) 7 
J. Legal Econ. 60, 60. 
5
 The European Association of Law and Economics has around 325 members 
6
  Oren Gazal-Ayal, “Economic Analysis of law in North America, Europe and Israel”, (2007) 
3:2 Review of Law and Economics 485. 
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According to Friedman, the economic analysis of law involves three distinct 
but related enterprises: the first is the use of economics to predict the effect of legal 
rules; the second is the use of economics to determine what legal rules are 
economically efficient, in order to recommend what the legal rules ought to be; the 
third is the use of economics to predict what the legal rules will be
7
The economists 
involved in the field of “law and economics” use the tools offered by price theory, 
welfare economics and public choice theory, which are also recognized sub-
disciplines of economics. To the difference, however, of the actors involved in these 
sub-disciplines, law and economic scholars are exclusively focusing on the study of 
substantive areas of the law, thus requiring the sharing of knowledge with legal 
scholars.  
The field of “forensic economics” is of more recent occurrence. A ready-made 
definition of forensic economics is “the analysis of the participation of economists in 
the litigation process”8. The primary focus of forensic economics is the measurement 
and valuation of economic loss (damage) involving mainly personal injury, wrongful 
death, employment discrimination and commercial disputes
9
. Economists have also 
                                            
7
  David Friedman, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (1987), vol. 3, p. 144. 
8
  T. R. Ireland, „The Interface between Law and Economics and Forensic Economics‟, (1997) 7 
Journal of Legal Economics 60, 60. Remark, however, the broader definition provided by E. Zitzewitz, 
Forensic Economics, February 2011, available at  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~ericz/forensic.pdf , p. 1, 
distinguishing between the traditional definition of forensic economics as “the application of 
economics to the detection and quantification of harm from behaviour that has become the subject of 
litigation, and has been practiced by experts who are paid by the court or one of the parties” and 
“academic forensic economics” which “applies economics to detecting and quantifying behaviour” in 
order “to advance the general understanding of behaviour that is important to the functioning (or dis-
function) of the economy”. 
9
  See, for instance, M. Berenbult, Litigation Accounting: the Quantification of Economic 
Damages (Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell, 1995); R.L. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits 
(4
th
 ed., Westport, CT: Lawpress, 1992); C.L. Knapp (ed.), Commercial Damages: A Guide to 
Remedies in Business Litigation (Matthew Bender, 1993); A.N. Link, “Evaluating Economic Damages: 
  
Participation in Authorship of L&E Articles
Source: Oren Gazal-Ayal, “Economic Analysis of law in North America, Europe and Israel”, (2007) 3:2 Review of Law 
and Economics 485
Population (m) Country Number of participants Per 10M people
Law Econ neither Law Econ Neither
299.093 USA 106 258 18 3.54 8.62 0.60
32.251 Canada 6 21 1 1.86 6.51 0.31
7.109 Israel 22 13 0 30.94 18.28 0.00
400.369 Europe 33 205 7 0.82 5.12 0.17
10.481 Belgium 5 8 0 4.77 7.63 0.00
5.425 Denmark 0 14 0 0.00 25.80 0.00
61.004 France 0 22 0 0.00 3.61 0.00
82.515 Germany 4 47 4 0.48 5.69 0.48
11.275 Greece 3 12 1 2.66 10.64 0.88
59.115 Italy 9 15 1 1.52 2.54 0.17
16.386 Netherlands 4 18 0 2.44 10.98 0.00
60.139 UK 5 23 1 0.83 3.82 0.17
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been used, albeit less frequently, for the purpose of determining the proof of liability: 
for example, in discrimination cases, antitrust (competition) law and public utility 
regulation
10
. Forensic economists are also concerned by “ethical issues involved in the 
twin roles of advocacy and computational neutrality by practitioners”, the “rhetoric 
and limits of economic science”, the “allocational impacts of various judicial 
doctrines relating to the character of allowable testimonial economic expertise and the 
development of solid procedures for interdisciplinary research leading to better 
estimation of damages”11.  
“Forensic economics” should be distinguished from the “law and economics” 
movement for the following reasons. 
First, forensic economics focus on issues of measurement and evidence, issues 
of expertise and the testimonial process, which are not topics within the traditional 
research agenda of the “law and economics” scholarship.   
Second, law and economics constitutes “primarily an academic discipline, 
without a professional side that involved compensated participation in the litigation 
process”12. In contrast, “forensic economics grew out of a desire by professional 
economic consultants and expert witnesses to establish contact with each other to 
discuss common problems that were both professional and academic in nature”13. 
Thus, “(s)uspicion has existed among economists not involved in forensic work that 
forensic economists are in the business of developing testimonial uses of knowledge 
to make money, not to seek knowledge for its own sake, as it is generally the case in 
economics”14.  
Third, one can clearly identify the tendency of forensic economists to organize 
themselves as a profession, which is certainly not a noticeable trend in the field of law 
and economics. For example, the National Association of Forensic Economics 
(NAFE), the first professional association of forensic economists, was founded in 
1988. NAFE has members across the United States, in addition to some international 
members. Prior to the formation of NAFE, forensic economists acted as independent 
agents with relatively little intercommunication among practitioners.  The main 
function of NAFE is to organize forensic economics‟ related events in major regional, 
national and international economic conferences. Its members receive information via 
quarterly newsletters and benefit from an Internet email group on forensic economics. 
The members of NAFE‟s Board are both academic and professional experts, although 
historically the Board has been mainly composed by academics. NAFE is publishing, 
since 1987, a specialised journal on forensic economics, the Journal of Forensic 
                                                                                                                             
A Handbook for Attorneys (Westport CT: Quorum Books, 1992); G. Martin, Determining Economic 
Damages (7
th
 ed., Santa Ana, CA: James Publishing, 1995); G.V. Smith and R. Parr, Valuation of 
Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2
nd
 ed., New York: Wiley, 1994); P.A. Gaughan and R. J. 
Thornton (eds.), Litigation Economics (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1993). 
10
  Robert Thornton and John Ward, The Economist in Tort Litigation, (1999) 13(2) The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, pp. 101-112, at 101. 
11
  T. R. Ireland, op. cit. p.65. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
   Ibid. 
14
  Ibid., p. 67. 
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Economics (JFE), which includes articles of interest to accountants, economists, 
finance and business professionals, lawyers in fields, such as business valuation, 
commercial litigation, torts and personal injury etc. NAFE is also publishing the 
Litigation Economics Digest/Review since 1995.  The American Academy of 
Economic and Financial Experts (AAEFE) was formed and began arranging annual 
sessions in Las Vegas in 1989, within a rather informal setting
15
. The AAEFE 
publishes the Journal of Legal Economics, since 1991. The Board of AAEFE 
comprises both professional and academic experts. Finally, the American 
Rehabilitation Economics Association (AREA) is an association of vocational, 
economic and life care planning experts who evaluate the impact of injury for the 
purposes of trial. AREA organizes an annual conference and is publishing The 
Earnings Analyst, highlighting the latest industry research and trends. All the 
members of the Board of AREA are professional experts.  
Of particular interest for our purposes is that both NAFE and AAEFE have 
published “ethics statements”, attempting to protect “the integrity of the profession” 
through adherence to a number of tenets of ethical practice, such as that the experts 
“should decline involvement in any litigation when asked to take or support a 
predetermined position, when having ethical concerns about the nature of the 
requested assignment, or when compensation is contingent upon the outcome” and 
imposing a duty of disclosure
16
. 
There have been several attempts to establish some form of certification of the 
profession of forensic economist. The efforts have been initiated by AREA, which put 
in place some form of registration process for forensic economists and established a 
certification for the position of Certified Earnings Analyst (CEA). The process is 
relatively informal and, at least for the registration as a forensic economist, requires 
some evidence of previous testifying activity and some form of peer review, although 
it is noted that this can be made via telephone if needed
17
. Both the NAFE and the 
AAEFE have opposed the attempts by AREA to certify forensic economists, the 
creation of the CEA position, which is not backed up by a formal state institutional 
mechanism of accreditation, being a compromise
18
. 
 It is thus possible to identify the emergence of a specific community of experts 
active in providing advice in litigation, sufficiently differentiated from the rest of the 
community of economists interacting with the legal system, the establishment of 
professional associations being the first step in the rise of a particular profession. 
                                            
15
  T.R. Ireland, Origins of the American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts, (2001-
2002) 11 Journal of Legal Economics 82-87. 
16
  American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts, Statement of Ethical Principles, 
available at http://aaefe.org/Documents/AAEFE_Ethical_Principles.pdf . See also, for a similar effort, 
NAFE, Statement of Ethical Principles and  Principles of Professional Practice, available at 
http://nafe.net/about-nafe/nafes-ethics-statement.html  Note that the AAEFE has a stronger disclosure 
statement than NAFE, requiring that such disclosure “should be in sufficient detail to allow 
identification of specific sources relied upon and replication of the analytic conclusions by a competent 
economist with reasonable effort”. 
17
  AREA procedures, available at http://www.a-r-e-a.org/downloads/procedures.pdf 
18
  T.R. Ireland, Origins of the American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts, (2001-
2002) 11 Journal of Legal Economics, at 85. 
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Nevertheless, these attempts have not led, for the time being, to the institutionalisation 
of a profession of “forensic economist”, and have been opposed to by the three 
associations of forensic economists.  
Fourth, contrary to the law and economics movement, which disposes of a 
clear research agenda, there are difficulties in defining a clear research programme for 
forensic economics. According to Brookshire, 
“(f)orensic economists are themselves from disparate sub-disciplines of 
economics and they have always worked with those in the separate discipline 
of law.”19. 
Their different economic backgrounds might also impede the development of a 
uniform research agenda for the discipline. Brookshire notes that 
“[…] this imbalance in research and analysis is because we are economists 
before we were forensic. Our academic prestige has been derived from our 
successes in the first area, rather than for our skills in the other”20. 
One could indeed identify smaller communities of forensic economic experts 
which present different characteristics from each other, depending on the areas of 
their consulting activity. Of particular interest for the purpose of our research question 
is the development of forensic economics in the area of industrial organization and, 
more specifically, competition economics. 
 
2.2. Competition economics and applied IO as a subfield of forensic economics 
 
 A quick look to the articles published in the two main journals on forensic 
economics show that studies on the application of forensic economics in 
antitrust/competition law are rare
21
. 
 
Figure 2: Number of articles on competition economics in forensic economic 
journals 
 
Issues period Number of Articles 
Journal of Forensic Economics 
Number of Articles 
Journal of Legal 
Economics 
1987-1990 0 Journal not established 
1991-1994 0 3 
                                            
19
  M. Brookshire, An Agenda for Future Research in Forensic Economics, (1991) 4(3) Journal 
of Forensic Economics 287-296, pp. 294-295 
20
  Ibid., p. 295. 
21
  See also, M.P. Schinkel, Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, (2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009573 , noting that “the vast 
majority of the papers published in the volumes of the Journla of Forensic Economics is on the 
quantification of damages in individual tort cases. Topics include the appropriate discount rate, 
expected employment duration and the effects of progressive taxes in present value calculations of lost 
earning as a result of personal injury and wrongful death. Typically, causality in these accident cases is 
straightforwardly established and has nothing to do with economics. Only a hand-full of papers 
discusses applications of economics to competition cases”. 
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1995-1998 1 0 
1999-2002 0 0 
2003-2007 1 1 
2008-2011 0 0 
 
The combined areas of damage analysis for personal injuries and wrongful 
deaths constitute the majority of research done in the area of forensic economics. 
However, it has been noted that 
“(i)n terms of published research and papers presented, antitrust law and the 
role economists play in antitrust litigation, while technically included within 
any reasonable definition of forensic economics, is really a subfield unto itself 
within the area of industrial organization rather than either forensic economics 
or law and economics”22. 
Publications in the area of competition economics (also empirical studies) 
usually appear in specialised journals in competition law and policy, with a mixed 
audience of lawyers and competition economists, or in mainstream economic 
journals
23
. Competition economists have also established their own academic 
association, the European Association of Competition Economists (ACE), with a 
mixed academic, regulatory and professional consultants‟ membership24. There is no 
equivalent association in the United States. There seem to be very few links between 
the members of the ACE and those of NAFE and AAEFE, and more broadly other  
groups of forensic economists. The very few publications on forensic economics in 
competition law focus only on competition economics and do not attempt to establish 
any serious linkage with the broader literature on forensic economics
25
. Forensic 
competition economics specialists are almost uniquely specialised in price theory and 
industrial organization (IO), thus the area is much less diverse than the broader field 
of forensic economics
26
.  
An important difference with the rest of the forensic economics community is 
that forensic competition economists or forensic IO experts are not only concerned 
with the assessment of damages, as it is usually the case for forensic economics, but  
“make some of its most fundamental contributions to competition cases by 
assisting to establish causality […] To determine likely causalities requires a 
                                            
22
  T.R. Ireland, Origins of the American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts, (2001-
2002) 11 Journal of Legal Economics, at 65. 
23
  To complete 
24
  See, http://www.competitioneconomics.org/  The steering committee for 2011 is composed 
by three professional consultants, three academic economists and three regulatory economists. The 
three constituencies are also equally represented at the executive of the Association.  
25
  See, J.M Connor, Forensic Economics : An introduction with special emphasis on price 
fixing, (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988709 ; MP Schinkel, 
Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009573 . More generally, see  
26
  See ibid, referring invariably to competition economics or forensic IO. 
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complex process of building a relevant economic theory, deriving testable 
hypotheses, and corroborating them with the help of econometric tests”27. 
The structure of the industry is another important distinguishing factor. In their 
recent studies on the development of forensic competition economics in Europe and in 
the Unites States, Damien Neven
28
 and Jon Baker
29
 note the increasing importance of 
forensic economic evidence in several steps of competition law litigation. Neven 
includes a rare analysis of the emergence of a market for economic advice in the area 
of competition law. He notes that  
“ (w)ith the implementation of the merger regulation in 1990, demand for 
economic advice seems to have risen. NERA opened an office in London in 
1984 and London Economics was set up in 1986. Lexecon (Ltd) was set up in 
January 1991 and up until the mid nineties, Lexecon, London Economics and 
NERA were the main suppliers with a total amount of fees around £ 2.5 
million in 1995. This turnover corresponds to EU related competition work but 
also to competition work in national jurisdictions. UK related work accounts 
for the vast majority of the latter. The market for EU related advice grew 
rapidly in the late nineties, as the number of merger notifications (as well as 
other types of cases) grew but also following the preparation and 
implementation of the notice on market definition [adopted by the European 
Commission]. This notice, inspired by the US practice, used economic 
concepts explicitly. […[ For the following ten years, total turnover grew at 
some 25-30% per year, reaching about £ 24 million in 2004”30. 
These estimations are based on the assumption that economic consultancy fees 
would amount to about 15 % of the total amount of legal fees, this percentage being 
more or less similar in Europe and in the US. Connor notes that antitrust economic 
consulting in the US must have exceeded $800 million per year in the late 1990s
31
. 
The industry has also moved towards global consolidation with a small number of 
global consultancy firms with operations in Europe and in the United States and some 
smaller boutique firms in important national jurisdictions. Neven observes that  
“(t)he market structure is […] characterized by the presence of three firms 
with global (or at least transatlantic) operations. In this respect, economic 
consultancy seems to have followed the same path as legal advice, both moves 
being triggered by clients with operations and antitrust filings across 
jurisdictions”32. 
An important factor to take into account is also the parallel development of 
market structures for economic consultancies active in competition economics advice 
and multinational law firms. Although the activities of economic consultancies 
                                            
27
  MP Schinkel, Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, (2008), above, at p. 7. 
28
  D. Neven, Competition Economics and antitrust in Europe, (2006) Economic Policy 741-781. 
29
  J.B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, (2003) 17(4) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 27-50. 
30
  D. Neven, Competition Economics and antitrust in Europe, above, at p. 6. 
31
  J.M Connor, Forensic Economics : An introduction with special emphasis on price fixing, 
(2006). 
32
  Ibid., at p. 7. 
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encompass a large number of areas, such as securities regulation and financial 
markets, valuation and financial analysis, bankruptcy and financial distress litigation, 
IP law and the assessment of damages in commercial and civil litigation, the area of 
antitrust/competition economics (forensic IO) has been traditionally one of the major 
practices and certainly the one that has permitted these consultancies to grow and to 
establish links with the major international law firms that form its main client base. 
 
Figure 3 : Areas of activities of the main economic consultancies 
 
 Compass 
Lexecon 
CRAI RBB Frontier 
Economics 
NERA 
Antitrust-Competition X X X X X 
Securities regulation – 
financial markets 
X X  X X 
Employment discrimination X X   X 
Bankruptcy and financial 
distress litigation 
X X   X 
Civil litigation – breach of 
contracts/torts damages 
X X   X 
Regulatory (telecoms, 
energy, auctions etc) 
X X X X X 
International 
Arbitration/Litigation/Class 
certification 
X X  X X 
IP Law X X   X 
Corporate Governance X X   X 
Environmental regulation     X 
 
The history of NERA (National Economic Research Associates), one of the first 
microeconomic consulting firms, illustrates the importance of antitrust and 
competition litigation in the development of this industry. 
 
The rise of NERA as an example of the emergence of a micro-economic 
consulting firm 
 
NERA was founded in 1961 by two professional economists with the advice of Alfred 
Kahn, a well known academic economist who has been active in government by 
heading in the late 1970s the efforts to deregulate the airline industry. NERA started 
as a small US based firm with 17 employees based in its two offices (in New York 
City and Washington DC). It was “the first consulting firm dedicated to methodically 
applying rigorous microeconomic thought to litigation and regulatory matters”33. The 
                                            
33
  NERA website, available at http://www.nera.com/7250.htm 
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firm‟s economists initially worked on projects including natural gas field pricing 
matters, particularly oil well-head price controls and provided testimony before state 
and federal US regulatory authorities in the utilities sector. Soon, the work of NERA 
extended to antitrust (competition law) matters, in particular in view of the long term 
relations that NERA managed to establish with key industry players requiring its 
economic advice, such as AT&T. In 1968, the firm was for the first time involved in 
securities regulation work, acting as consultants for the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), thus expanding its expertise from Industrial Organization issues to financial 
economics. As a result of the increasing workload, linked to the expansion of the use 
of economics in antitrust and regulatory matters, the firm expanded in the US in the 
1970s, opening offices in Los Angeles in 1974. The deregulation process in energy 
markets and other major industries in the late 1970s greatly enhanced the work of the 
company, which acted advising both companies and a number of regulators and 
governments, in such diverse areas as the oil industry, communications, shipping, 
transportation, postal rate economics, airlines, consumer products, television and 
newspapers, and sports economics. In 1972, the firm also expanded its work in 
employment discrimination cases. The increasing amount of work in certain areas led 
NERA to establish formal practices (departments) within the structure of the 
company, in particular in the areas of antitrust, energy and communications 
regulation. The company was involved for the first time in an environmental law case 
in 1978, on the calculation of damages to natural resources and cost/benefit studies on 
environmental pollution. According to NERA‟s website, NERA‟s “prominence in 
antitrust led the firm to hold its first annual Antitrust Seminar in Aspen, Colorado, in 
July 1979”, which continues to bring together regulators, antitrust practitioners, and 
NERA economists. The firm formally established its Securities and Finance Practice 
in 1987. The spread of the deregulation movement beyond the US in the 1980s led to 
the international expansion of NERA, which opened its first non-US office in London 
in 1984, largely to assist the UK government with matters related to privatization. In 
the late 1990s, NERA had grown to more than 400 members, including 300 
consulting economists. The early 1990s is also the period when NERA developed its 
Mass Torts and Product Liability Practice and IP litigation practice. The firm further 
expanded its presence internationally opening offices in Madrid, Spain (1990), 
Sydney, Australia (1998), Brussels (2000), Tokyo and Rome (2001), Paris (2003), 
Frankfurt (2004), Shanghai and Melbourne, Australia (2006), Beijing, Geneva, 
Auckland and Wellington, New Zealand (2008). NERA now operates 20 offices 
around the world. In 2004, NERA founded its London-based Competition Policy 
Practice, thus illustrating the importance of the competition economics practice as a 
specific field of forensic economics. According to information provided in NERA‟s 
website, NERA is planning to expand its activities to new competition law 
jurisdictions, such as India, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, and South Africa, thus 
illustrating the multinational dimension of commercial and trade law disputes. 
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Notwithstanding the expansion of forensic economics to a variety of areas, the 
corporatisation of forensic economics, with the emergence of multinational economic 
consultancies specialised in support services for litigation, is more pronounced in the 
area of applied IO to competition and regulatory litigation, than in other areas of 
practice. This accentuates the important differences that we have previously identified 
with regard to the self-perception of competition economists as a separate community 
from other forensic economists.  
A possible explanation for this different self-perception is the integration of 
economists in the state bureaucracies involved in the enforcement of competition law, 
in comparison with their relative minor role in other areas, such as environmental 
regulation, employment discrimination, IP law etc. Neven noted that in 2004 there 
were 83 professionals with a background in economics and around 184 with a 
background in law (hence roughly a ration of 1 to 2) at the European Commission, 
this ratio being 1 to 7 in the early 1990s. To this, one could add the establishment in 
2003 of the position of chief economist of the European Commission with a team 
consisting of 10-15 PhD economists. Neven estimates that there were a little more 
than 150 professional economists working with economic consultancy firms in the 
area of competition economics in 2004 and more than 100 professional economists 
working with the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the US Federal 
Trade Commission. The expansion of economic consultancies worldwide and the 
increasing recruitment of economists by a number of national competition authorities 
in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Oceania during the last five years may put the 
figure of forensic economists, working in the private sector or governmental 
bureaucracies to a figure between 3000 and 4000 individuals
34
. The multiplication of 
economists working in regulatory agencies, in particular competition authorities has 
not occurred to the same extent in other areas of law, where generalist courts 
constitute the main enforcement engines and regulatory authorities are staffed mainly 
by lawyers.  
 
2.3. The link between the communities of practice and theory: forensic IO and 
academic economists 
 
We will focus on the specific community of forensic IO economists working 
in antitrust/competition law litigation, exploring how this community interrelates with 
the community of academic economists in the area of Industrial Organization. We 
will highlight, first, their role in competition law litigation and, secondly, the issues 
this might raise with regard to the interaction between forensic economists and 
lawyers and between forensic economists and academic economists. 
 
                                            
34
  According to the some rough calculations by the author. This is based on the fact that the 
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association had in recent years an average membership of 
15000, many of which are economists, assuming that 15% of the legal fees are used to hire economic 
consultants.  
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2.3.1. Forensic IO economists and their contribution to legal practice 
 
The increasing influence of economic discourse (Industrial Organization) on 
competition law is well documented. The main tenets and principles of competition 
law witnessed a profound transformation with the systematic recourse to neoclassical 
price theory as an external source of authority for competition law. More than in any 
other field of law, except perhaps the related area of public utilities law, competition 
law is intrinsically linked with the discipline of economics, as this is shown by the 
frequent references to economic concepts and methodology of competition 
authorities, the case law of the courts and the expanding soft law relating to the 
interpretation of the competition law statutes. A common feature of this 
transformation of competition law is the emphasis put on a, mostly synchronic, 
analysis of the welfare effects of the specific commercial practice on consumers or 
more broadly economic efficiency. This is the main thrust of the “more economic” 
“effects-based approach” that has gained momentum in the US before being 
transposed to European competition law and more recently to new competition law 
jurisdictions, such as China, India etc.  
An important part of the evidence presented in competition law disputes is of 
economic nature, such as econometric techniques and economic models. Consulting 
economists have acted as witnesses in US antitrust trials since at least the 1920s, but 
commonly only since the 1960s. Connor relates that the first refereed economic 
journal articles explaining some of the methods used by economists in antitrust 
litigation were published in the late 1960s and 1970s
35
.  
Forensic IO is relevant in all steps of antitrust litigation, either in front of 
regulatory authorities or presented in courts. First, at the detection and investigation 
phases, forensic IO can help to uncover recognized types of antitrust violations by 
systematically screening industries and firms as well as by assisting the antitrust 
agencies to actively discover and assess the illegality of certain business strategies
36
. 
Second, the main function of forensic IO is the building of the economic logic of a 
case. Assessing the existence of market power through the application of the SSNIP-
test for the determination of the relevant market, HHI calculations for merger 
assessments, the Elzinga-Hogarty-test for market delineation have become standard 
procedures in enforcing competition law in an array of jurisdictions. Third, forensic 
IO may assist in determining appropriate remedies in cases in which an antitrust 
concern or an infringement has been established, including the quantification of 
damages and the design of an effective private enforcement practice. 
Economic evidence may take different forms: economic theory and models or 
quantitative econometric studies. The following table illustrates the importance of 
quantitative econometric methods in competition law enforcement in recent years. 
                                            
35
   J.M Connor, Forensic Economics : An introduction with special emphasis on price fixing, 
(2006). 
36
  MP Schinkel, Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, (2008), above, at p pp. 
8-9. 
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Figure 4: Quantitative techniques in merger control in EU competition law 
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However, forensic IO is not only relevant for the adjudication of evidence in 
specific competition law disputes but is also contributing to legal hermeneutics with 
the incorporation in law of “economic transplants”. This term refers to any concept of 
economics that has been incorporated into the legal discourse by an act of translation 
performed by an organ vested with the authority to adjudicate and capable therefore 
of producing an impact on the interpretation of legal norms. Economic transplants are 
essential intermediary steps in the process of qualification of the facts of a 
competition law case, but also, in some circumstances, provide content to the text of 
the law (market power, barriers to entry, consumer welfare, efficiency gains). In 
competition law, economic transplants were predominantly integrated by the 
instrument of soft law (Guidelines)
37
. This followed the path of US antitrust law. 
Starting with the 1968 Guidelines on Merger Enforcement, US antitrust law integrated 
different economic concepts that became influential in framing antitrust law discourse 
in courts and consequently led to the development of forensic IO
38
. 
Hillary Greene‟s important study on the institutionalization of US merger 
guidelines in antitrust discourse provides an excellent example of the integration of 
economic transplants through the instrument of guidelines
39
. Greene gives the 
example of concentration measures in merger control in order to illustrate the impact 
of the guidelines. Prior and shortly after the 1968 US Guidelines on merger control, 
the Courts employed the four-firm (CR4) concentration measure in merger analysis, 
representing the sum of the market shares for the four largest firms in the market
40
. In 
1982, the DOJ revised its 1968 guidelines and introduced a new measure of 
concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (called HHI), which is the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of the firms present in that market
41
. Hillary Greene 
observes that the HHI index was discussed in economic circles, since at least the early 
1960s
42
, when George Stigler published his seminal work on oligopoly theory
43
, and 
that it “became part of the mainstream legal literature” following the suggestions of 
the law professor, then judge, Richard Posner
44
. She observes, however, that the case 
law on Section 7 of Clayton Act (the US merger statute) has ignored the HHI index 
                                            
37
  Ph. Areeda, „Justice‟s Merger Guidelines: The General Theory‟ (1983) California Law Rev 
303-310. 
38
  The 1968 Guidelines were the intellectual child of Donald Turner, the first PhD economist to 
be appointed Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and a key figure in the re-orientation of antitrust 
law in the US towards an economic approach in the 1960s. See, O. Williamson, „The Merger 
Guidelines of the US Department of Justice – In Perspective‟ available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11257.htm#N_1_ (last accessed July 18, 2009). 
39
  H. Greene, „Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust 
Discourse‟ (2006) 48(3) William & Mary L Rev 771-857. 
40
 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1968, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
13,101 (May 20, 1968). 
41
 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1982, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)¶ 13,102 
9June 14, 1982). 
42
  H. Greene, above n , at 788. 
43
  G. Stigler, „A Theory of Oligopoly‟ (1964) 72(1) Journal of Political Economy 44-61, at 59. 
44
  R.A. Posner, „Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach‟, (1969) 21(6) 
Stanford L Rev 1562-1606, at 1602-1603. 
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until the 1982 Guidelines were adopted
45
. Prior to that date, case law was written 
almost entirely in terms of CR4 or other concentration ratios. Immediately after the 
adoption of the 1982 Guidelines, a transition period started during which both CR4 
and HHI concentration measures were relied by the courts, although the later gained 
progressively a more important role
46
. She also notes the important increase of the 
rate of references to the guidelines since the early 1970s. In conclusion, the adoption 
of new version of Guidelines profoundly influenced the direction of the case law 
(hard law). According to Greene,  
“from around 10-15% in the 1970s the reference rate increased to 15-20% in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1983 shortly after the adoption of the 1982 
Guidelines were issued, the reference rate increased to above 50% and by the late 
1980s the rate averaged 60% or higher. After the 1982 Guidelines were issued, 
merger guidelines quickly became the “basic reference point” in section 7 Clayton 
Act rulings”47. 
As a consequence of the increasing relevance of economic evidence in 
competition law cases, the role of forensic economists is now pivotal in competition 
litigation. Evidence is often presented by experts employed by parties and providing 
advice on the economic merits of the case representing persistent communities of 
practice outside the legal domain
48
.  
 
2.3.2. The influence of external (legal) factors in the production and evaluation of 
economic knowledge 
 
As it has been noted by some academic commentators, “the law today not only 
interprets the social impacts of science” but also “constructs” the very environment in 
which scientific discourse comes to have “meaning, utility, and force”49. Economic 
research completed “in the context of application” is conducted and interpreted to 
answer legal questions; the content of scientific knowledge is shaped in a complex 
social process, which includes the legal sub-system as well as the economic scientific 
discourse. Judicial decision-making exercises also an important influence on the 
definitions of “good science”, therefore affecting at the same time the content and the 
direction of economic discourse.  
An illustration of the profound interaction between legal and economic 
discourse is the emergence of economic “schools of thought”, as a way to 
conceptualize and rationalize ex post legal doctrine and authority in the area of 
competition law. There is a lot of literature recently on the question of the dominant 
“school” of economic thought that is followed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Professor Einer Elhauge from Harvard University has recently published an 
                                            
45
  H. Greene, above n , at 789. 
46
  Ibid., at 790-791. 
47
  Ibid., at 802-803. 
48
 Déirdre Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence (Cambridge Univ. Pres, 2008), at 
76. 
49
  Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997), at 16. 
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article entitled “Harvard, not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent 
Supreme Court Decisions?”, implying that there is a dominant “school” of economic 
thought that provides its conceptual guidance to the antitrust jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court. After examining the 14 most recent cases of the Supreme Court in 
antitrust professor Elhauge argues that  
“the Supreme Court has sided with the Harvard School… It has also sided 
with sound economic analysis to resolve antitrust issues, rather than a resort to 
either the old formalisms that favored plaintiffs, or new formalisms that try to 
favor defendants”50. 
Professor Joshua Wright from George Mason University argues exactly the opposite:  
“the Roberts Court decisions embrace the Chicago School of antitrust analysis 
and predict that the antitrust jurisprudence of this Court will increasingly 
reflect this influence”51. 
These are non-exhaustive examples of the growing antitrust law and 
economics schools-related literature in antitrust.
52
 If explanatory features of economic 
discourse, such as schools of economic thought, become also explanatory features of 
legal discourse, there is a point to make on the profound interaction and mutual 
influence between the two spheres. But how this process occurs? 
 A possible explanation is the existence of a hybrid competition law 
community formed by lawyers and economists that is in constant communication, 
either in the practical aspect of competition law enforcement or in the more 
theoretical aspect of competition law doctrine. However, this does not explain why 
only certain schools of economic thought seem to attract the interest of competition 
law doctrine and not others. One could argue that this is linked to the fact that only 
specific schools of economic thought have been attentive to the issue of competition. 
This is certainly not a satisfactory response: for example, there is a distinct Marxist 
theory of competition, which, for different reasons has never made it to the 
courtrooms and has never attracted the attention of competition law discourse
53
. An 
alternative explanation may be that some of the members of the economics 
community benefit from a privileged access to the legal community in competition 
                                            
50
  Einer Elhauge, “Harvard, not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions?”, (2007) 3(2) Competition Policy International, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010769, at 1. 
51
  Joshua Wright, “The Robert Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 term and 
beyond”, (2007) 3(2) Competition Policy International,available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?&id=582&action=907 
52
  The focus is almost on the same schools: Harvard, Chicago, post-Chicago, but also includes 
in Europe the ordo-liberal school (see for example the analysis of Alberto Pera, “Changing Views of 
Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law”, (2008) European Comp J 127). One could 
also add studies exploring the influence of new-institutional and Austrian economics in competition 
law (see, for new institutional economics, Ioannis Lianos, Commercial Agency Agreements, Vertical 
restraints and the Limits of Article 81(1): Between Hierarchies and Networks [2007] 3(4) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 625-672; Dina Kallay, The Law and Economics of Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property – An Austrian Approach, (Edward Elgar, 2004). 
53
  See, Anwar Shaikh, „Competition and Industrial Rates of Return‟, in Philip Arestis & John 
Eatwell (ed.), Issues in Finance and Industry – Essays in Honour of Ajit Singh (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008) pp 167-194. 
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law, therefore being able to pass their specific message on the relevant and adequate 
economic discourse that should underpin legal discourse. This hypothesis, which 
needs to be empirically verified, builds on the observation that economists that are in 
constant communication with competition lawyers in enforcing competition law 
influence the perception, by these lawyers, of the content of economic discourse. The 
increasing role of economic consultancies and forensic economics in competition law 
and policy illustrates the profound interaction between these different actors/agents 
and the constitution of specific sub-communities. The emergence of a market for 
economic experts in Europe illustrates the development of forensic economics or 
applied antitrust economics as a specific field of economic enquiry.  Competition law 
experts are also highly specialised and are intensive users of economic reasoning, 
even in areas outside the close realm of competition law.  
My hypothesis assumes that there are two distinct sub-communities in 
industrial organization (IO) economics: forensic economists and academic economists 
and that the respective influence of schools of economic thought may be different in 
each of these two communities. The distinction between purely academic economists 
and forensic economists is not something specific in economics. Krohn distinguished 
three types of research situations, depending on the reward structure and the time 
spent for non-research activities: 
1. “Academic basic research: scientist were hired to perform limited non-
research duties, and obtained outside support for (presumably) 
theoretical research of their own choice. 
2. Open-applied research: scientists were hired to perform limited non-
research duties and obtained outside support for (presumably) practical 
research of their own choice. 
3. Bound-applied research; scientists were hired to work full-time on 
problems related to the purposes of their employing organizations”54. 
Forensic economists are situated across the pole that goes from “bound-applied 
research” to “open-applied research”, as some of them are also active academics, 
while academic economists concentrate at the pole of “academic basic research”, with 
some being occasional consultants and thus included in the “open-applied research” 
category. The intermediary category of academics that are also acting as forensic 
economists is of particular importance for our study, as they might act as 
communicators of the values of each pole to the other. 
This distinction needs to be established empirically, for example by examining 
the representation of each school of economic thought, as identified by the fact that 
the members of this “school” or “network” share common beliefs, in the sub-
communities of forensic economists and academic economists, as well as by 
identifying situations where there is a significant gap of representation for a school in 
each sub-community. In other words, the research will measure the distribution of 
specific beliefs within each community. The distinction between forensic and 
                                            
54
  Roger G. Krohn, The Social Shaping of Science (Greenwood Pub., 1971), p. 115. 
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academic economists also assumes that the mode of operation of each sub-community 
is different.  
Based on the work of Robert Merton on the reward system of open science, 
based on priority, one could argue the specificity of the academic community of 
economists with regard to community of forensic economists, which is not marked by 
openness (there is an inherent bias that only the results that could be positive to the 
client are publicly shared)
55
. Furthermore, the structure of rewards is different. In 
essence, the reward system in science is managed by the scientific community itself. 
This does not exclude the intervention of the market mechanism, but at a second 
stage, after the social reward structure of collegiate science took place, “picking up” 
the disclosed knowledge or information brought in by the open science phase in order 
to develop new products and services
56
. Dasgupta and David have clearly shown that 
changes brought to the underlying reward system of science will have particular 
implications on the “autonomy” of the scientific process, “in the sense of the scientific 
community‟s self governance and control over the research agenda”57. Others, like 
Wible have developed a complements view of the organization of the scientific 
process, with market and nonmarket institutions being separate institutions but also 
fulfilling the “dual nature of the scientific enterprise”: a unique non market structure 
and a “secondary science” relying on markets58. Wible emphasizes the need to 
preserve this institutional and epistemic diversity:  
“a variety of qualitatively differentiated organizations are essential for 
resolving epistemic scarcity. Humanity cannot depend on just one institution 
like the market or even the primacy of one institution among others. We 
cannot pull all our organizational „eggs‟ into one institutional basket”59. 
Calls for epistemic diversity have also been recently made in competition law 
economics literature. Oliver Budzinski, among others, has highlighted the risks of 
“monoculture” in competition economics and proposed “theory pluralism” of 
competition policy paradigms as being an essential prescription for public policy in 
this area
60. Budzinski‟s argument must be understood in the context of the debate over 
the need or not to harmonize competition law globally. His contribution attempts to 
demonstrate the benefits of a decentralised approach. However, his most recent 
formulation of the pluralism argument goes further than that. After exposing the basic 
tenets of different competition theories and policy programs (classic and neoclassic 
price theory, Harvard, Chicago and post-Chicago schools, German ordoliberalism, 
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  Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations 
(University of Chicago Press, 1979), Chapter 4.  
56
  D. Wade Hands, Reflection without Rules (CUP, 2001), at 377. 
57
  Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, „Towards a New Economics of Science‟, (1994) 23 
Research Policy 487, at 505. 
58
  James R. Wible, The Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics 
Really Mattered (Routledge, London, 1998), at 172. 
59
  Ibid., at 174-175. 
60
  Oliver Budzinski, „Pluralism of Competition Policy Paradigms and the Call for Regulatory 
Diversity‟, N014/2003, Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Marburg, 2003, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=452900 ; Oliver Budzinski, „Monoculture versus 
diversity in competition economics‟, (2008) 32 Cambridge Journal of Economics 295. 
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Austrian market process theory), Budzinski concludes from this pluralism that it is not 
possible to derive “an unequivocal, scientifically true antitrust policy”61. He is critical 
to the attempt to perform comparative evaluations of market performance in 
economies with different institutional and policy choices in order to decide which are 
the adequate competition policy programs (best practices), a procedure that is broadly 
used at the international level (OECD, ICN). These attempts underpin the idea that 
there is a superior, “objective”, theory; however, as he immediately remarks, even 
within the Popperian framework, theories can be proved false but not true, therefore 
there cannot be any serious claim for an ultimate theory
62. “Sustainable pluralism of 
competition theories” should thus serve as an imperative for science and public 
policy.  
Budzinski‟s policy recommendations are nonetheless less clear. The main 
difficulty of his conceptualization lies with the different time frame and objectives of 
judicial decision-making, in comparison to those of the scientific process. For 
example, should the objective of theory pluralism lead the courts to choose a minority 
theory instead of a majority one, the two theories being equal from the point of view 
of explanatory power, for the simple reason that choosing a dominant theory will be 
reducing pluralism? On what practical basis should this choice for pluralism be made 
in this case? Would that require the artificial preservation of “degenerescent” research 
programs for the simple sake of pluralism? Budzinski‟s focus on pluralism (the end 
result to achieve) ignores an important aspect, which is mentioned in his study, the 
theory selection process. Any analysis of pluralism should depart from the 
consideration of the selection process and in particular the reasons that lead to its 
biased non pluralistic results, as demonstrated by the use of the terminology of 
“dominant” paradigm. It is certain that if the selection process, which can be 
conceived as applied practical reason, worked well, there would be no “dominant” 
theory, in the sense that the representatives of all “research programs” and 
“paradigms” will feel confident that their positions are equally taken into 
consideration in adjudicating each case. 
The lack of trust in the selection process could be explained from the fact that 
there is the perception that actors (“research programs”, “paradigms”, “schools”) 
behave strategically. The hypothesis examined in this study is that the existence of a 
market for economic experts may affect the scientific process of investigation in 
economics. Contrary to other disciplines, where forensic scientists and academic 
researchers form distinct scientific communities, the leading forensic competition 
economists are academics who actively participate in theoretical economic debates. 
Consequently, the emergence of a market for economic experts inevitably affects the 
research agenda of certain areas in economics (e.g. industrial organization) linked to 
competition policy. This introduces a novel research question, which has to be 
examined empirically, through the analysis of the work of economic consultancies, 
their links with academic economists, the emergence of a specialisation of forensic 
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economists to defendant or plaintiff-friendly in order to enhance their employability, 
their links to lawyers and the judicial system, among others. 
 
3. Analyzing forensic economics from a sociological perspective: elements for a 
theory 
 
 The theme under examination presents important theoretical challenges. We 
aim to study the emergence of forensic economists in competition litigation in order 
to evaluate their impact on the research agenda of industrial organization economics 
and to understand the evolution of this discipline. Our ultimate aim is to develop an 
understanding of how the production of scientific knowledge by economic 
consultancies affects the way economic knowledge originates and is processed as it 
becomes established, and ultimately, how this affects the éthos and values of the 
economic science produced. Hence, we will proceed with the aim  
(i) to examine forensic economics as an episode in the process of 
professionalization of economics by looking to the interrelationships 
between  the various economics “professions” (academics, business and 
government economists),  
(ii) to study the strategies of forensic economists developed in a specific field, 
where they interact (and compete) with other actors/agents,  
(iii) to determine the influence of the professionalization process and, more 
specifically, the emergence of forensic competition economists, on the 
content and the structure of economic discourse. This third step will 
attempt to explore the links between the structure, institutional 
organization and the methodology/content of economics.  
(iv) to explain how the economic knowledge originated from this new 
institutional setting affects the epistemological foundations of economic 
science and, more generally, the norms guiding good scientific research. 
 
3.1. The “professional project” of forensic economists 
 
The focus on the “professional project” of forensic competition economists should 
be perceived as a means of understanding the development of the occupation of 
providing economic advice in litigation to become a real “profession”. Larson‟s 
conceptual framework might be helpful in understanding the process by which, 
forensic economists, as producers of special services, seek to constitute and control a 
market for their expertise
63
. Her approach breaks with the structuralist framework of 
Parsons
64
. Larson highlights how the constitution of professional markets, a process 
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that began in the nineteenth century, was an attempt to translate special knowledge 
and skills to social and economic monopolistic rewards. 
 The first phase of professionalization came through the constitution of 
professional associations and the subsequent closure of the domain through 
accreditation and professional examinations. This is certainly a strategy that 
characterizes the rise of the traditional professions in the 19
th
 century (law, medicine) 
but does not reflect the more sophisticated strategies adopted at the later stages of the 
development of the “professional project”. Larson refers to the importance of 
developing a “cognitive basis” as a mechanism to control the providers of 
professional services in order to standardize and thus identify the commodity they 
provide
65. However, as she also remarks, “a cognitive basis of any kind had to be at 
least approximately defined before the rising modern professions could negotiate 
cognitive exclusiveness – that is, before they could convincingly establish a teaching 
monopoly on their specific tools and techniques, while claiming absolute superiority 
for them”66. The monopoly is thus constituted by the linkage of rewards with merit by 
means of formally universalistic criteria of recruitment and promotion and by the 
parallel construction of a “monopoly of credibility” with the larger public67. From this 
perspective, “cognitive standardization allows a measure of uniformity and 
homogeneity in the production of producers”. Furthermore, “the more formalized the 
cognitive basis, the more the profession‟s language and knowledge appear to be 
connotation-free and objective”68.  
It is argued that in economics, this process took the form of the “mathematizing 
inclination”69 that provided the “internal logical consistency”, through 
“methodological formalization70”, but also the necessary closure of the discipline. As 
it is noted by Coats, “[…] the so-called mathematical-quantitative revolution in 
economics has brought the theoretical core of the subject much closer to the ideal of a 
“restricted” discipline”71. Larson‟s interactionist approach encourages the researcher 
to regard social processes as the product of individual and collective actions, and 
respectability as something which is actively pursued. The modern professional 
project tends to integrate the production of knowledge with professional practice. 
Professionalization becomes therefore a collective project which aims at market 
control. For this to occur successfully, we need to have on one side a specific body of 
knowledge, or expertise, including techniques and skills and, on the other, a market of 
services. Larson observes how  
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“the notion of expertise incorporates contradictory principles (:) One the one 
hand, it embodies the rationalizing and universalistic legitimation of market 
monopoly, insofar as it is standardised expertise, accessible to all who care to 
be adequately trained and qualified. One the other hand, expertise is also used 
to claim superior rewards and to establish social distance from other 
occupational groups.
72” 
The establishment of corporations active in delivering professional advice 
constitutes another illustration of the “bureaucratic phenomenon” that “creates the 
structural context of successful professionalization”73, which is another means to 
enhance the reputation of a profession and the constitution of professional markets.  
The focus on the constitution of professional markets leads to comparing different 
professions in terms of the marketability of their specific cognitive resources. 
 One could consider the applicability of this framework to the 
professionalization of economics with the emergence of the “profession” of forensic 
economists, as a step in the professional project of economics. In a series of studies, 
Coats focuses on the transformation of economics from an academic subject and 
occupation to a professional venture, but also on the interaction between the 
professional project of economics and the evolution of the professional identity of 
economists
74. According to Coats, “(i)n the economics community the academic ideal, 
namely that of the pure research truth-seeker, the detached non-partisan expert, 
outweighs any more pragmatic conception of professionalism or public service”75. He 
argues that “the conception of professional neutrality […] has exercised a potent force 
in the creation and maintenance of the economists‟ collective professional identity”76.  
An illustration of this evolution is how the Keynesian revolution of the late 
1930s and 1940s led to an explosion of non-academic, essentially government jobs, in 
the area of economics. The academic tradition of neutrality, but also the focus of 
government technocracy on public service might have contributed to the emergence 
of a culture of impartial expertise in the collective professional identity of economists. 
This has been so strongly geared towards efficiency and free markets that economists 
questioned more openly and more persistently than other social scientists the merits of 
professionalism and consequently the quest for monopoly
77
. According to Coase, 
“although academic economists necessarily influence entry into the profession 
through their control of the degree process, they have consistently opposed any kind 
of formal professional accreditation”78. This characteristic establishes an important 
distinction between economists as a “newer profession” and more historic 
professions, such as medicine and law. Again, according to Coats, 
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 “(u)nlike the older type of so-called „status‟ professions such as law or 
medicine, whose practitioners exercise considerable control over membership 
and occupational conditions, the newer type of profession remains closer to 
the academic conditions of proof… gives less protection to the individual 
member … and concerns itself less with official certificates of competence 
than the traditional profession. Its members‟ organizations are “learned 
societies” and their allegiance is primary to the substantive field, not the guild. 
Although their functions may be performed largely in a bureaucratic context, 
the science, not the bureaucracy, defines employment standards and because 
the work is largely science, not art, it can be evaluated with some precision”79. 
 This statement should nevertheless be revised in view of the emergence of 
forensic economics as an important occupation for economists specialised in 
Industrial organization. One could indeed need to look to statistics on the percentage 
of economists following a career in the private sector, as opposed to economists active 
in academia and the government to measure the impact of forensic economics on the 
formation of the economists‟ collective identity80.  It is clear that forensic economists 
have resisted so far to some form of accreditation or professional examination that 
would control their emergent professional market. Is this a strategy that aims to 
reinforce the respectability and high status of the profession? Can the emergence of 
forensic economics lead to a redefinition of the collective identity of economists 
towards a position of relative (and not absolute) adversity to monopoly and 
consequently make them more inclined to pursue some form of legal monopoly of 
knowledge-based services? This is an important question to be explored. 
 Yet, the focus on the monopoly quest of the “professional project” of 
economics might be reductive. As Abbott highlights, to study professionalism is 
misleading as it looks to form rather than content, and largely ignores that “a 
fundamental fact of professional life is inter-professional competition […] (i)t is the 
history of jurisdictional disputes that is the real, the determining history of 
professions”81. Others highlight the importance of the relations between the 
professions and the State as part of the aims of the “professional project”. Burrage 
focuses specifically on the legal profession; he notes that “if all professions in their 
pursuit of monopoly and privilege have entered into a special relation with the State, 
lawyers in all parts of the division of legal labour had a specific relationship to an arm 
of the State – judicature – and in some cases were unambiguously integrated into the 
State apparatus”82. A similar strategy may be identified with regard to economists. 
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The expansion of the economic profession to the regulatory agencies‟ arena in the 
area of competition law and utilities regulation has led to a multiplication of job 
opportunities in the private sector of the economy and the rise of economic 
consultancies. The institutionalisation of roles, such as that of chief economist in 
various competition authorities worldwide illustrates this strategy of entanglement of 
the State power by economists. The next frontier seems to be the judiciary, with the 
recent calls for more specialised jurisdictions disposing of some form of economic 
expertise
83
.  
The monopolization of this emergent professional market should not be 
considered as the only objective sought; the promotion of the value of efficiency, dear 
to the collective professional identity of economists, could also constitute an 
important aim. In this vein, Halliday notes that the legal profession has a distinctive 
relation with the State because of its interest for an effective legal system, the 
legitimacy of law as an institution and the intrinsic merits of procedural justice and 
legalism
84
. Some other authors highlight the positive implications of professionalism 
as a form of social organization: professionalism is perceived as an ideal type 
grounded in the political economy and presents the concept as a third logic, or a more 
viable alternative to consumerism and bureaucracy. It refers to a world where workers 
with specialized knowledge and the ability to provide society with especially 
important services can organize and control their own work, without directives from 
management or the influence of free markets. Widespread attacks by neoclassical 
economists advocating efficiency are challenging the social value of credentialism 
and monopolies
85
.  
In her more recent work, Larson has focused on the relations between knowledge 
and power by employing the terminology of “discipline”, rather than the narrower 
concept of “profession”86.  Larson and other authors, such as Goldstein87, highlight 
the ambiguous duality of the concept of “discipline”, perceived on one side as “the 
maintenance of a set of rules” and on the other side as a “branch of knowledge”. The 
monopolization of a specific discourse constitutes the means through which power is 
exercised. This discursive monopoly is granted if the profession, transformed to a 
discipline, succeeds in presenting its theoretical apparatus as scientific, that is, 
empirical, objective, disinterested and methodologically rigorous
88
. Larson notes that 
the University departments constitute the core regions where professional discourse 
develops
89
. The links between the communities of academic economists and forensic 
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economists in the area of Industrial Organization and forensic competition economics 
guarantee the semblance of neutrality of the produced knowledge, conceived as a 
strategy for exercising power. But what is the social space on which interactions, 
transactions and eventually the power is exercised? 
 Focusing on the relations between academic and forensic economists and on 
the evolution of their professional project ignores the entanglement of economics with 
other “disciplines” and “professions” with which they are in constant interaction, as 
well as the interest of universalizing power struggles, the literature until now focusing 
on the national level. The work of Dezalay highlights how the emergence of a new 
international arena of expertise blurs the boundaries between the different professions 
by enabling mainly national actors to adopt international strategies that will build their 
power at home
90
. Dezalay narrates the basic shift that took place in Latin America in 
the 1980s and 1990s from a legal-centered approach oriented towards the European 
continent to an economics-based approach oriented to the United States. The 
economists employed “cosmopolitan scholarly strategies” leading to the hybridization 
of business law by subsequent law reforms according to the dictates of economists. 
One could add the links that exist between the corporatisation of forensic economics 
and the emergence of large multinational law firms, as a further illustration of this 
international dimension. 
 What these strategies show is that the concept of profession, with its well-
defined boundaries, is a “prefabricated concept” that ignores the “process of 
constitution of specific world fields, into which the national fields have been drawn, 
while retaining a greater or lesser relative autonomy”91. I will attempt to sketch how 
the concept of “Field” might provide a better starting point in understanding these 
complex interactions. 
 
3.2. Forensic economics and their “Field”: towards a linkages approach  
 
The conceptual apparatus offered by Bourdieu‟s theory of practice enables us to 
map and understand the relation between forensic economists and other actors with 
whom they interact in the social space, but also to explore linkages with the sociology 
of knowledge literature
92
.  
For Bourdieu, practice results from the relation between one‟s dispositions 
(habitus) and one‟s position in a field (capital) within the current state of play of that 
social arena (field) 
 
Practice = (habitus) (capital) + field 
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Each social field of practice can be understood as a competitive game or a field of 
struggles in which social agents strategically interact in the quest to maximise their 
positions. Habitus consists in a structure comprising a system of dispositions which 
generate perceptions. It denotes a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction that 
contributes to the constitution of the field
93
. The social field consists of positions 
occupied by social agents. At stake in the field is the accumulation of capital, which 
can take four forms: economic (e.g. money, assets), cultural (e.g. knowledge), social 
(e.g. networks, affiliation) and symbolic (e.g. credentials). Employing field theory, 
our research should attempt to analyse the positions of the field vis-a-vis the field of 
power and to map out the objective structures of relations between the positions 
occupied by the social agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate forms of 
specific authority. 
 It is possible to conceive the social arena of competition law litigation as a 
specific field on which different players, forensic economists, lawyers, academic 
economists, regulators, judges develop strategies. Each of these groups detains a 
position in the field that is determined by their specific disciplinary competences. 
Each of them competes with each other for the acquisition of symbolic, and then 
economic and social capital. Yet, despite their different dispositions and strategies, 
these actors should be conceived as being entangled in a mutual process of influence 
that contributes to the ongoing co-construction of a field. 
 It follows that focusing the analysis on the emergence of the profession of 
forensic economists without examining the complex relations forensic IO economists 
develop with other actors they interact with, profoundly misunderstands their 
strategies and misses the important changes that take place in their dispositions, their 
specific doxa, when internalizing the specific economic and social conditions that 
characterize the field.  
 One could aim to map the positions of the different actors and their relation to 
the field of power, in our case the government regulatory bodies and the judiciary. 
The integration of scientific knowledge in the regulatory decision-making process has 
been a major source of legitimation of technocracy. Jasanoff noted how the expansion 
of the role of technical experts with the constitution of specific regulatory institutions 
led to an isolation of the scientific and political decision-making and the positivistic 
value-fact separation
94. It has also led to the emergence of a “regulatory science 
(science used in policy making)” or “mandated science”, which presents distinct 
characteristics from “science in a research setting” (or ordinary science)95. Regulatory 
science includes “a component of knowledge production”, as does ordinary science, 
but also a “substantial component of knowledge synthesis”, which includes 
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“secondary activities, such as evaluation, screening, and meta-analysis”96. 
“Regulatory science” is largely “predictive”, as it feeds decision-making, the later 
being constrained by time and resources, in contrast to an ordinary science-setting 
where a long process of peer reviewing assures a gate-keeping function. As Jasanoff 
explains, “science carried out in non-academic setting may be subordinated to 
institutional pressures that critically influence researcher‟s attitudes to issues of proof 
and evidence” and “in turn affect the packaging and presentation of scientific 
results”97. An important difference between pure and mandated science, in our case 
academic economics and forensic economics, resides in the definition of standards by 
which each is evaluated. Jasanoff rightly notes that 
“(a)cademic research, on the whole, works within established scientific 
paradigms, subject to relatively well-negotiated prior understandings about 
what constitutes good research methodology […] Instead, the guidelines for 
validating science in the regulatory context tend to be fluid, controversial and 
arguably more politically motivated than those applicable to university-based 
research”98. 
In essence, the contention is that forensic economics is shattered between two 
different conceptions of true beliefs: what is taken as true and false in court is 
sometimes different from what might be taken to be scientifically true or false. This 
turns us to the next question, which is the influence of forensic economics (the 
discourse produced by forensic economists) on the content and the structure of 
economic thought. 
 
3.3. The influence of forensic economists on the content and the structure of 
economic thought 
 
The recourse to the “regulatory science” of economics as a source of wisdom 
for competition law can be merely explained by the quest of the antitrust 
technocracy
99
  for credibility and thus ultimately authority. The perception of the 
“regulatory science” of economics as a significant hermeneutic tool in the 
enforcement of competition law mirrors the image of the ordinary science of 
economics as a quintessentially objective quest for knowledge. It is because the 
“regulatory science” of economics emulates or approximates the “mores” of the 
ordinary scientific process that it becomes a valuable source of authority. The 
underlying assumption is that the credibility of such knowledge rests on objective and 
impartial epistemic achievements. Thus, being more than a simple moral or technical 
prescription, the image of objectivity operates a legitimacy function, as a rationale for 
the exercise of power. The delinking of “regulatory science” from its social context 
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and its consequent linkage to the conventional imaginary of “ordinary science” 
participates to this effort of promoting its credibility as a hermeneutic tool. This 
indirect reference to the éthos of “ordinary” science has resolutely a Mertonian taste. 
The assumption is that the “regulatory science” of economics will fulfil the four sets 
of institutional imperatives set by Merton: universalism with its requirement of 
objectivity and impartiality, communism with its aversion to secrecy, 
disinterestedness with its emphasis on competition and testability, and organized 
scepticism with its opposition to crystallization
100
. One could identify in the efforts of 
“regulatory science” to integrate peer review processes and a strict scrutiny by experts 
of the verifiability of results, an attempt to emulate the institutional imperatives of 
“ordinary” or “academic science”101. 
The Mertonian conception of disinterestedness advocates a primordial 
distinction between the éthos of the scientist and the professional éthos: 
“The scientist does not stand vis-á-vis a lay clientele in the same fashion as do 
the physician and lawyer for example. The possibility of exploiting the 
credulity, ignorance and dependence of the layman is thus considerably 
reduced […]”102. 
 In the Mertonian conception of science, rewards for scientists are “largely 
honorific, since even today, when science is largely professionalized, the pursuit of 
science is culturally defined as being primarily a disinterested search for truth and 
only secondarily a means of earning a livelihood”103. Merton went even further by 
warning that “(t)o the extent that the scientist layman relation does become 
paramount, there develop incentives for evading the mores of science”104. 
 The association of the scientific process with other segments of the social 
structure could be a source of predicament and tension. Writing in 1938, Merton 
identified the problem of the domination of the scientific enterprise by political 
authorities, in view of the expansion of the role of the State, and the risks that this 
paused to the norms of the scientific éthos: 
“The norms of the scientific éthos must be sacrificed insofar as they demand a 
repudiation of the politically imposed criteria of scientific validity or of 
scientific worth. The expansion of political control thus introduces conflicting 
loyalties […] 
The sentiments embodied in the éthos of science – characterized by such terms 
as intellectual honesty, integrity, organized scepticism, disinterestedness, 
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impersonality – are outraged by the set of new sentiments that the State would 
impose in the sphere of scientific research ”105. 
The intervention of an external authority, outside the realm of the process of scientific 
discovery, is, thus, seen as a major anomaly to the Mertonian framework of impartial 
science. 
 Turning to the research question examined in this study, it is clear that the 
emergence of forensic economics challenges this core conception of science. Acting 
as party experts in a regulatory or a litigation setting, forensic economists are 
inevitably influenced by their material interests in the dispute, notwithstanding the 
effort of the legal system to establish a duty of the expert to the (impartial) court
106
. 
The substantive findings of the expert economist are not always made public, as this 
might jeopardize the likelihood of success of the case, if these findings are adverse to 
the interests of their clients. This feature contradicts the requirement of communism, 
secrecy being the antithesis of this norm. The payment of hefty fees to economic 
experts by the litigants negates also the essence of the norm of disinterestedness. 
Merton‟s concern over the influence of the external authority on the definition of 
norms of scientific validity seems to describe well the situation of forensic economics, 
with the (important) difference that it is the market for economic advice that interacts 
with the scientific process, and not the political authorities or the State in general, as 
was feared by Merton. Certainly, this focus on the State is historically contingent: 
State intervention was predominant in the late 1930s, when Merton was publishing his 
Science and the Social order, while our time period is marked by the global expansion 
of markets. Nevertheless, legal requirements of admissibility of economic evidence 
and the substantive evaluation of economic theories with the mechanism of peer 
review and/or various legal standards of proof reproduce the Mertonian framework. 
The legal system appears permeated with this conception of scientific purity and the 
dissociation of science from various social interests. 
 This study resolutely opposes this view. We start from the hypothesis that 
every knowledge created to serve policy needs, in this occurrence the “regulatory 
science” of forensic economics, is sociologically distinct from other forms of 
knowledge and in particular its academic/ “ordinary science” counterpart. Regulatory 
science is actively developed in response to practical contingencies and produced by 
social groups engaged in particular activities. Knowledge is thus socially determined. 
Mannheim refers to these extra-theoretical factors that are not driven by the “inner 
dialectic” of the thought107. We should aim precisely to examine these “existential 
factors” influencing the content of economic knowledge in the area of Industrial 
Organization. One can assume that the conditions of the existence of an idea, its 
historical and social genesis, exercise an inevitable influence on its content and form. 
Every assertion can thus only be relationally formulated: an assertion by an economist 
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in the context of a trial or regulatory decision-making should be assessed differently 
than her assertion in the context of a purely academic discussion. It is thus important 
to make an effort of “sociological imputation”, in order to explain the impulse and the 
direction of development of economic thought in each of these contexts, by looking to 
the composition of the groups which express themselves in that mode of thought
108
. 
This effort can take two forms, according to Mannheim: 
“In the first place it is a purely empirical investigation through description and 
structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence 
thought.  
This may pass, in the second place, into an epistemological inquiry concerned 
with the bearing of this interrelationship upon the problem of validity”109. 
With regard to the first step of the inquiry, taking an interactionist and 
constructivist perspective on scientific knowledge, the “Strong programme” in the 
sociology of knowledge may help us to highlight and understand the “social 
component
110” of the knowledge produced by forensic economists. For Bloor, 
“(d)eductive logic is the creature of our inductive propensities” and “the product of 
interpretative afterthoughts”111. Informal negotiations, what is otherwise referred to as 
“an interpretative or hermeneutic process”,112 over general propositions constitute the 
core of the process of knowledge production
113; “Negotiations create meanings”114. 
Adopting a form of methodological and cognitive relativism, the proponents of the 
strong programme argue that “ideas of knowledge are based on social images” and 
that “objectivity is a social phenomenon”115. Social interests, in particular “vested 
professional interests”, influence the standards and conventions of science116. 
However, the fact that the social component is always present does not necessarily 
mean that it is the only component that triggers change. How then to distinguish the 
“social component” of academic economics from that of forensic economics?  
This study assumes that the content of scientific knowledge is shaped in a 
complex social process. Social networks and relations of power have important 
implications on the directions of the future research agenda and on the emergence of 
dominant schools of thought in economics. For example, legal mechanisms, such as 
specific standards for the admissibility and evaluation of expertise, may be used by 
the different actors of the system in order to gain a leading position for their “school” 
of economic theory. The social costs include the costs flowing from the monopoly of 
a particular school of economics in the marketplace of ideas. This is a significant 
concern, in view of the important economic consequences of competition law 
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litigation and the benefits of scientific pluralism, the existence of different research 
programs, for the consideration of all important aspects of human behaviour, not 
necessarily taken into account by all schools (an example could be the concept of 
bounded rationality). 
Competition law may be an important and valuable “ally” for competing 
networks, in particular because of the professionalization of economic expertise in 
this sector and the ability to attract new members to join the “schools” or “network”, 
essentially because of the important “rents” to be shared. The assumption is that, as 
any other rational economic agent, economists are rational maximizers of wealth 
engaged in rent-seeing activities
117
. One could conceptualize the members of an 
economic “school” or network as seeking to increase the relevance of their “school” 
of thought for legal analysis and exclude competing networks.  
Proving the blurring of the distinction between academic economists, 
motivated by the reward process of open science, and forensic economists, motivated 
by a different reward market-based process, is an important step in recognizing that 
radical changes in the reward structure of science leads to a biased selection process 
in terms of theory pluralism. The blurring of the distinction between forensic 
economics and academic economics corresponds to actual practice: exchanges 
between expert witnesses are not confined to the courtroom but, in practice, extend to 
the broader academic debate, in journals, conferences, the SSRN etc. Preparing the 
public defence of a specific theory and position that is favourable to one of the parties 
in these academic circles is part of the strategy to establish the legitimacy and 
persuasiveness of the claim. Ironically, this is also one of the side-effects of the 
distrust of judges towards expert witnesses. When they refer to economic reasoning, 
judges tend to grant more weight to published economic commentary rather than to 
the expert witnesses‟ reports. 
Drawing on Actor Network Theory, Yval Yonay examined the conflict 
between the old institutionalists and neoclassical economists in the Inter-War era
118
. 
The struggle between these two “networks” is of particular importance for my 
purposes, as each school has profoundly influenced competition law and policy in 
different periods of time. Institutionalists were attached to the empirical and inductive 
model of science. For them valid theory should be dynamic, evolutionary and relative, 
concerned broadly and objectively with processes rather than with precise 
implications of conceptual definitions, scientifically inductive rather than 
formalistically logical in method.
119
 Neoclassicists counter-attacked by pointing out to 
those aspects of prestigious sciences that were more similar to the deductive methods 
of neoclassical economics, such as theoretical physics. In the absence of the 
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possibility of laboratory experimentation (as neoclassical economists rejected 
introspection as a valid method of observation), economics was justified in being even 
more deductive in its nature than physics. Institutionalists‟ emphasis on the role of 
social institutions is a further source of disagreement. In contrast, neoclassical 
economists focused on a specific aspect of human volition and insisted that economics 
should focus on illuminating the rational aspect of human behavior, without 
integrating in the analysis exogenous factors, such as institutions. The trial of strength 
between institutionalists and neo-classical economists was finally won by the latter, 
because of the alliance of neoclassical economic theory with mathematical 
economics, in particular during the 1950s.
120
 The power of attraction of mathematical 
economics was augmented by the development of econometrics as a new approach to 
quantitative research that differed from the way institutionalists practiced such 
research. The alliance between neoclassical economics, mathematical economics and 
econometrics managed to turn quantitative research from an ally of institutionalists 
into an ally of neoclassical economics. The intense use of the language of 
mathematics or mathematical reasoning has indeed been considered by some authors 
as the demarcation point between orthodox (neoclassical) and heterodox 
economics.
121
 
As different networks engage in continuous trials of strength, one cannot 
exclude that the legal system may operate as an important strategic ally. The 
normative force of the legal system will ensure that the societal structure that a social 
science, such as economics, attempts to explain, will be profoundly influenced by the 
concepts and way of thinking of the mainstream economic theory of the moment. It is 
quite well accepted and documented that economic theory may be the conceptual 
substratum of many parts of the legal system. One may give the example of the 
laissez-faire doctrine of the classical school of economics as a main inspiration of the 
Western legal system until the emergence of the progressive movement in late 19
th
 
century. Soviet Union, where the entire legal system was built on the foundations of 
Marxism also provides a compelling example. It seems that the integration of 
economic learning by the legal system constitutes an assurance of success in the trials 
of strength that oppose different networks in economics and has stabilizing effects for 
the mainstream. It may also explain the considerable lag between the emergence of a 
new theory/network as mainstream in science and its adoption by the legal system. 
For example, although the Chicago school criticism to activist antitrust enforcement 
dates from the late 1950s/1960s, their influence at the courtroom has been felt much 
later (at the end of 1970s). The particular characteristics of legal authority and 
precedent may explain lawyer‟s reticence to embrace new economic theories.  
It could be argued that one of the strategies of scientific “networks” is to 
influence, to take up the legal system. The legal system will bestow its authority on 
the theories defended by the members of the network. In other words, the legal system 
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is a powerful ally. This point of view has important implications on the debate over 
scientific economic expertise in courts. The exclusion or marginalization of 
competing networks from the process of expertise, by presenting them as unscientific 
or unreliable, constitutes a rational strategy. This may be particularly attenuated by 
the development of an exclusionary éthos for certain types of economic expertise, 
based on methodological concerns, themselves influences by methodological 
monoculture. 
The legal system may be an important and valuable “ally” for competing 
networks, in particular because of the professionalization of economic expertise in 
this sector and the ability to attract new members to join the “schools” or “network”, 
essentially because of the important “rents” to be shared. The assumption is that, as 
any other rational economic agent, economists are rational maximizers of wealth 
engaged in rent-seeking activities
122
.  
There has already been some work on the interaction between the social 
context of the production of economic knowledge and the content of economic 
thought. George Stigler has performed a statistical analysis of the communications 
network, career patterns, reward system and social stratification of economics, 
through the study of the content and the status of economic journals
123
. Stigler noted 
the importance of economist‟s influence in policy, in particular by examining the 
integration of economists at the Federal Trade Commission and their interaction with 
lawyers at the agency
124
, as well as by the type of employers of doctorates in 
economics, business and government representing a quarter of the Doctorates‟ 
employers in 1969
125
. Stigler observed that before the establishment of independent 
commissions and boards regulating the industry the detachment of economists from 
“contemporary policy was Olympian”126. Nevertheless, under the influence of the 
German Historical school and the institutionalist movement in the early quarter of the 
20
th
 century, American economists have been increasingly involved in matters of 
policy. Stigler documented the large number of publications on monopoly and public 
regulation as appearing at the Index of Economic Journals from 1900 to 1965 and 
noted that during the first decade of the 20
th
 century, the number of articles published 
on the problem of monopoly was substantially higher than their number during 1960-
1965, an era marked by an intensive antitrust enforcement in the United States. These 
findings do not challenge the main contention of this research, which is that the rising 
professional interest of economists in the area of competition law and economics led 
to an increase of the interest of academic articles published on these topics. Indeed, it 
is in the mid to late 1970s that the US Supreme Court and the antitrust agencies began 
having access systematically to economic inputs in their decision-making practice.  
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Coats examined also the significance of the professionalization process of 
economics
127
. He specifically focused on the interrelationships between the various 
economics professions (academic, government economists, business). Drawing on the 
Strong Programme in Sociology of Scientific knowledge
128
, Coats highlights the 
importance of the social context of scientific thought for the formation of beliefs and 
scientific concepts. Conventions approved by the scientific community form the 
essence of all scientific concepts, theories, tests and judgements. Reference to 
specific, local, contingent circumstances is thus an important element of 
understanding the emergence of a scientific concept, as each scientific community has 
its own accepted patterns of concept application. Coats analyses the resistance of 
economists to the adoption of a sociological interpretation of their discipline and the 
embracement of the quantitative logic in economics, as forming part of the strategy of 
economists to bring their subject matter closer to the “ideal of a restricted discipline” 
and to enhance the intellectual authority and autonomy of economics by excluding 
politically sensitive questions from the scope of the discipline
129
. Hence, there are 
links between the methodology and scope of economics and the trend towards their 
professionalization. For Coats, “the rise of professionalism both within the academic 
community and in society at large represented an effort by new specialist groups to 
gain social status and market power”130. This took first place in the academic field, the 
first associations of economists aiming to transform their subject to an autonomous, 
from moral philosophy, academic discipline. Coats narrates the “academization” of 
economics, “meaning that the university became the principal intellectual and social 
context for the advancement of scientific economics” in the late 19th century131. 
However, he also notes that the rapid growth of non-academic opportunities, in 
particular in government, following the Great Depression and the rise of state 
interventionism in the 1930s, challenged the traditional academic locus of scientific 
economics. Coats alludes to the inevitable influence this had on the content of 
economic thought, although this part of the argument has not been further exploited in 
his analysis. Nevertheless, the problem is set in quite unambiguous terms: 
“[…] in so far as academic and non-academic employers and employees attach 
markedly different values to specific components in the economist‟s 
knowledge and skills, the scope for dominance by a reputational elite is 
correspondingly undetermined”132. 
 If the “academization” movement in economics led to the abandon of certain 
contentious questions, such as wealth distribution and distributive justice, from the 
economists‟ areas of interest, and the narrowing down of scientific economics, the 
second professionalization phase, with the development of careers in government and 
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business, might also generate a different intellectual trend in economics and possibly 
lead to changes in the internal values and hierarchy of economic thought.  
 Coats does not examine this angle, but instead links the “professional 
ideology” of economists to the conception that they constitute “neutral objective” 
experts. In the economics community, “the academic ideal namely that of the pure 
research truth-seeker, the detached non-partisan expert, outweighs any more 
pragmatic conception of professionalism or public service”133. The conception of 
“professional neutrality” has exercised “a potent force in the creation and 
maintenance of the economist‟s collective professional identity”134. Coats highlights 
how the emergence of agricultural economics as a distinct field of scientific 
economics is intrinsically linked to the increasing role of economists in some areas of 
government. Yet, Coats‟ analysis, although useful from a descriptive point of view 
remains incomplete. First, he does not explain how this movement of 
professionalization outside academia affected the content of economic thought 
produced, its methodology and its standards of validity. Second, his choice of 
studying the role of economists‟ in government offers limited opportunities to identify 
the differences that might exist between the content of the knowledge produced in 
academia and in government. Economists working in government are motivated by 
the pursuit of public interest objectives, the nature of the interests of their employer, 
the government, being by essence compatible with the image of the economist as a 
non-partisan expert. Coats thus misses the inherent tensions between the role of the 
economist as employee and his self-framed imaginary of neutral expertise, which 
would have been more visible, had he focused instead on the examination of the role 
of economists in business, and in particular, as opposing experts in litigation and 
regulation. 
Davies‟ work suffers from a similar narrowness of perspective135. Noting the 
increasing role of the economic logic in government decision-making, and the 
subsequent integration of economists in public bureaucracies, in particular in the field 
of competition law, Davies attempts to understand the normative presuppositions of 
government economists, as opposed to their academic peers. He observes that the 
antitrust economist has to strike “uneasy bargains” with lawyers and that “the 
scientific authority of neo-classical analysis must be balanced against the political, 
bureaucratic authority of the lawyers within the anti-trust agency”136. We are on 
familiar ground here, the content of “regulatory economics” being somewhat different 
from that of “academic economics”. Taking a Weberian approach and employing 
semi-structured interviews with two dozens of government economists working for 
the European and the US competition agencies, Davies examines the inward and 
external vocations of antitrust economists. He notes that antitrust government 
economists are intensively engaged with academic groups in their discipline and seek 
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publicity and transparency on their work, through academic publications, which is 
unusual for bureaucrats. There exist also important differences as to the normative 
presuppositions of each group: bureaucratic economists carry more (neo-classical 
theory) presuppositions and exclude more questions of worth than academic 
economists; the empirical mind-set seems also more entrenched with bureaucratic 
economists. What transpires from Davies‟ work is that the “overlap between the 
scientific and the bureaucratic political vocation” of antitrust bureaucratic economists 
“leads to an intensification of certain norms and rituals”137. Yet, Davies misses an 
important dimension of the story by not examining how the emergence of forensic 
economists, working as party-experts in litigation, might affect this transformation of 
norms and rituals. He also neglects to study thoroughly the interaction between 
lawyers and economists in antitrust decision-making, by exploring specific case 
studies where the standards of validity of neo-classical price theory analysis had to 
adjust to the legal requirements of proof or, more generally, the principle of legal 
certainty. 
While not focusing on the competition economics‟ field, Marion Fourcade‟s 
excellent comparative cultural sociology analysis of the dialectic relationship between 
culture and economics in United States, France and the UK provides a useful account 
of the linkages between the ideals of the profession of economists and the 
transformation of the content of economic analysis
138
. Fourcade reflects on the impact 
of national constellations and various institutional logics on the development of 
economic theory and methodology. Her case study consists in the rise of “the 
economic industry”, with the contracting out by government of many decision-
preparation tasks to economists, either integrated in the government bureaucracy or in 
the academic field. Although she notes the increasing entanglement of economics 
with the corporate world and more generally the marketplace, as well as the 
emergence of a substantial market for economic consultants in the legal sector, this is 
not part of her main narrative. The process of “marketization of economics” is clearly 
noted, but its implications for the evolution of economic thought rest unexplored. A 
possible reason might be that her comparative perspective limits the scope of her 
study to the interaction of economists and government, as the role of economists in 
the private sector is more limited in France and the UK, than it is in the United States, 
or at least it forms a very recent occurrence. Nevertheless, her observations on the 
“scientific professionalism” of economics, as a result of the intervention of 
economists in public and private arenas, and the fact that the relationship between 
economic knowledge and state power define in large part the field‟s social purposes 
and the distinctive identity of its practitioners, provide a fruitful perspective of 
particular interest for the purposes of our study on forensic economics.  Yet, 
Fourcade‟s emphasis on the government sphere only,  omits from her analysis the 
emergence of a global market for economic advice and the transformation of 
economists to “merchant professionals”, evolution that she confines to the specific 
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institutional and cultural context of the United States
139
. Yet, the area of competition 
law illustrates a profound transformation of economic practice in the areas of 
Industrial Organization and microeconomics, not only in the United States, but also in 
all the major European jurisdictions, where economists have been increasingly 
involved in the interpretation and enforcement of competition law. This gap in the 
literature is the main focus of the author‟s ongoing study on forensic IO economists 
and economics. 
Concerning the second step of the inquiry, one could explore how interests 
outside the academic field impact on the evolution of economic thought and the 
standards of validity of economic knowledge in the industrial organization field. 
Certainly, this is not the first study of the important function interests play in the 
formation of scientific discourse. Barnes, among others, has challenged the 
conventional understanding of scientists as passively apprehending reality: “whatever 
the interests that guide knowledge generation, socially sustained consensus and a 
modification of existing meanings will always be involved in the process”140. 
Habermas also accepts that the validity of scientific knowledge is predetermined by 
specific knowledge constitutive interests (KCI) in prediction and control, which vary 
according to each situation: different types of knowledge derived from the 
corresponding interests have different principles of validity
141
. This is particularly the 
case for economics, which shares a hybrid nature presenting the characteristics of 
both empirical-analytic knowledge and historical-hermeneutic knowledge, if one 
employs Habermas‟ categories142.  
Under Barnes‟ conception, knowledge is primarily and always instrumental, 
“it is generated and evaluated in a way that is pre-organised by an interest in 
prediction and control, and normative, in the sense that it is sustained by a communal 
consensus which is decided, and not a rational necessity”. These instrumental interests 
vary according to the specificities of each situation. Barnes suggests a “subjective, 
experimental approach” in identifying the operation of concealed interests. Yet this 
method fails to find a solution to the problem of imputation, that is, the association of 
specific beliefs or parts of knowledge to particular interests. In my view, this is 
extremely difficult to achieve and constitutes a fruitless enterprise, if one accepts that 
the same scientific knowledge used in different social contexts will respond to 
different interests. For example, the development of economic knowledge in an 
academic setting, might be seen as serving broadly the cognitive interests of 
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historical-hermeneutic knowledge, but also to a certain extent, if examined from the 
perspective of the professionalization process of economics, “academization” forming 
an initial step in this process in order to build the credibility and authority of 
economic knowledge, it might also be seen as serving an interest in technical control, 
characteristic of the empirical-analytic knowledge. Hence, focusing exclusively on the 
interests pursued by the scientific knowledge, does not provide a clear understanding 
of the evolution of the standards of validity in economics and alleged differences 
between “regulatory economics” and “academic economics”.  
A different strand of literature has focused on new knowledge production in a 
post-academic science setting. Current changes in scientific practice challenge the 
traditional conception of knowledge production as being located primarily in 
scientific institutions, such as Universities, and structured by scientific disciplines. 
Recent research has highlighted that scientific knowledge is increasingly the product 
of trans-disciplinary collaboration and takes place in a heterogeneous environment, 
where not only Universities, but also the public and the private sector contribute to 
knowledge production. Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott and Trow 
employed the term of Mode 2 knowledge to distinguish science produced in a 
“context of application”, according to a “dialogic process” that incorporates multiple 
societal interests and institutions, such as universities, research centres, corporations, 
consultancies
143
. Mode 2 knowledge is profoundly contextualised: for example, the 
traditional peer review systems of Mode 1 science are supplemented by additional 
criteria of economic, political, social and cultural nature. Mode 2 knowledge does not 
substitute but only complements Mode 1 knowledge. Nevertheless, its standards of 
validity are different. Some authors even claim that Mode 2 knowledge production 
illustrates a shift from “quality control” to “quality monitoring”, a concept permitting 
the inclusion of new peers, such as users and lay persons, in the evaluation of 
knowledge and awarding greater consideration to the instrumental concerns of 
scientific knowledge, in the context of its application
144
.  
Nevertheless, whatever is the name given to this description of the evolution 
of knowledge production
145, Mode 2, “post-normal science”, “Triple-Elix”, “post-
academic science”, the general question of validity of the knowledge produced is not 
examined by this literature. As Ziman observes, the “meta-scientific spotlight has 
shifted to ethical issues”, but in fine more general questions of validity of established 
scientific theories or the weight that should be given to a highly unorthodox scientific 
opinion remain largely unexplored
146
. A recent effort, by the Mode 2 knowledge 
promoters, to discuss the standards of validity of “contextualized science” has not 
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been convincing. Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons argue that “contextualized science” is 
the product of the increasingly close interaction between science and society
147
. 
Knowledge is produced in a new heterogeneous public space than the University, 
what they call “the agora”, where society and science meet. With regard to the 
standards of validity of this new knowledge, they note the evolution from reliable 
knowledge to “socially robust knowledge”. The latter is “relational” and “process 
oriented”. No clear explanation is provided on what distinguishes this type of social 
robustness from the scientific robustness required for Mode 1 knowledge. 
Furthermore, they observe the emergence of socially distributed experts, coming from 
other parts of society that are active in the process of knowledge production and 
evaluation. Their claim for expertise is not only based on scientific reputation but on 
their ability to orchestrate the many heterogeneous and context-specific knowledge 
dimensions that are involved. Although the analysis provides useful insights, the 
volume is relatively poor on the criteria for judging when knowledge production in 
Mode 2 is robust and when it is not. The standards of validity of a theory or technique 
in “regulatory economics” are the product of a constant dialogic process with the 
standards of validity in “academic economics”, an illustration of how the emergence 
of Mode 2 science leads to contextualized definitions of robustness and how the 
standards of validity of “academic economics” may sometimes be subject to those of 
“regulatory economics”.   
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
 The field of economics has seen a profound transformation the last thirty years 
with the development of an active sub-field of practice, forensic economics, and its 
linkage with the legal system and the legal profession, more generally. The area of 
Industrial Organization, in particular, has seen a profound transformation from a 
purely academic and theoretical discipline to a professional endeavour with a broad 
field of practice in the areas of regulation and competition law. The area of welfare 
economics is also in the process of been transformed with the systematisation of cost 
benefit analysis and impact assessment in Europe, hence requiring a greater 
integration of economists in the evaluation of public policies, at both the government 
level and private practice. The role of the economist has gone from being merely 
complementary to become competing with that of another profession, much more 
organized and institutionally aware of its distinct role, that of lawyers. The relation 
between lawyers and forensic economists can be characterized as a form of co-
opetition, where they have to cooperate in order to provide the best service to their 
clients and represent them in courts and competition/regulatory authorities (the 
economists having a role of advocate manning the language of numbers, statistics and 
quantitative evidence), but also compete for rents, in the market for litigation services, 
as they need to share the fees paid by their clients for their legal/economic evidence 
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representation. Powerful economic consultancies, a more concentrated market than 
that of law firms in Europe, act as important agents for  the representation of the 
interests of economists, in contrast with the more classic and old-style regulated 
profession of lawyers, whose institutional interests are represented by elected mostly 
institutions (the Bar Associations). Yet, these seem not to be in pace with the 
neoliberal emphasis on promoting competition and have increasingly incurred 
difficulties with their positioning in the public space, in view of the recent efforts of 
liberalization of professions and the dislocation of professions regulation. The 
emergence of forensic economics has important implications on the production of 
knowledge in economics and the interaction between heterodoxy and the mainstream 
in economic thought. 
 One should not forget that forensic economists have a dual/hybrid function. At 
some regards they operate as advocates, their interests being those of their clients, as 
lawyers usually do (“the market sphere”). However, they are also operating as 
“scientists”, academics or intellectuals (“the intellectual sphere”) where they produce 
“economic knowledge”. It is also generally accepted that “the reception, survival and 
diffusion of intellectual products – whether as research programmes, theories, 
concepts and propositions – depends not just on the intrinsic arguments proposed or 
the strength of the evidence provided, but also on the range of rhetorical devices 
which the authors employ to locate themselves (and position others) within the 
intellectual and political field”148. An intellectual intervention, be it at an article 
published in an academic journal or economic testimony in a legal brief, does not 
have “an intrinsic meaning as such; it acquires its meaning in a  particular setting; it is 
dependent on the status, position and trajectory of the author(s) and on the other 
intellectual products available at the time”149. As Baert explains: “effective 
positioning might help to diffuse the ideas or it might help the agent‟s career and 
material prospects”, as it might also have adverse effects150. Yet, the integration of 
this double “milieu” of forensic economists in conceptualizing their work and in 
particular their “positioning” with regard to other agents operating in a particular 
context has been largely ignored by the literature. By focusing on the effects of 
forensic economists‟ interventions in the field of economics (intellectual sphere), 
positioning theory might offer a useful tool in order to understand the process of 
knowledge creation in the post-academic “science” of economics. 
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